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Abstract
We study an incomplete contract model where both contracting parties can invest, and the
investments have both self- and cross-effects. We analyze the performance of non-contingent
contracts, message games, option contracts and property rights. We find that the first best is
implemented if (i) the cross effects are negative or weaker than self-effects; (ii) the strength of
cross-effects relative to self-effects is symmetric across parties. If either of these conditions is
violated, even message contingent revelation mechanisms fail to provide efficient incentives. For
this case, we obtain a number of results characterizing the second best. We find that property rights
outperform contracts and partially relax the symmetry constraint. In either first best or second
best, the stronger the cross-effects, the lower the value of contracting. The optimal allocation of
property rights assigns ownership to the party with stronger cross-effects.
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1 Introduction
?
An important function of contracts is to provide trading parties with the proper incen-
tives for relationship-specific investments. If a contract makes payments and deliveries
contingent on states of nature and on the quality of the good traded, both ex post trade
outcome and ex ante investments are e?cient. In the real world, however, it is impossible
or prohibitively costly to write and enforce such a contract, so parties have to resort to
incomplete contracts. A key feature of the incomplete contract models is ex ante uncer-
tainty of ex post non-verifiable gains of trade that makes incomplete contracts vulnerable
to renegotiation. Unless parties can commit not to renegotiate the contract, the hold-up
problem arises. Hart and Moore (1988) have shown that this leads to underinvestment.
In this paper, we concentrate on a di?erent problem related to contractual incom-
pleteness, namely on providing incentives for relationship-specific investments with cross-
e?ects.1 Investments with cross-e?ects are very common in bilateral relationships. For
example, a supplier can influence unverifiable quality of input which determines the value
of the input to its buyers. An employee may invest in job-specific skills that will improve
the quality of output but will be of little value outside the firm. Employers may provide
employees with benefits and perquisites that are often employee-specific. Che and Hausch
(1999) provide many other examples of cross-investments. In the collection of empirical
studies of specific investments in a very broad range of industries (Masten, 1996), most
cases involve cross-e?ects.
As shown in Che and Hausch (1999), it is very hard to provide e cient incentives once
the investments are cooperative, i.e. involve positive cross-e?ects. Segal and Whinston
(2002) suggest that the problem may be less severe when the cross-e?ects are negative.
Indeed, if the cross-e?ect is negative, the challenge is over- rather than underinvestment.
In order to reduce incentives to invest, parties can deliberately introduce hold-up by
specifying trade below the ex post e?cient level or even by not contracting ex ante at all.
However, Segal and Whinston (2002) consider the setting where only one party invests.
As we discuss below, this is an important restriction: providing incentives to one party
a?ects the incentives of the other one. Indeed, suppose that parties’ cross-e?ects have
opposite signs. Then hold-up improves incentives of a party with a negative cross-e?ect
(reducing its tendency to overinvest) but aggravates the ine?ciency of incentives of the
party with a positive cross-e?ect which already underinvests relative to the first best
level.
In this paper, we consider a general framework where both parties can invest and
the investments can have positive and negative cross- and self-e?ects. We believe that
negative cross-e?ects are as common as positive ones; also, there is no reason to believe
that the parties’ cross-e?ects have the same sign and strength. Indeed, consider the con-
ventional bilateral trade setting. Suppose that a seller can invest in a new technology
that may influence her costs and a buyer’s valuation of the good to be produced. By
1Che and Hausch (1999) refer to cross-investments as ‘cooperative’ investments. We prefer to use
the term ‘cross-investments’ (MacLeod and Malcolmson, 1993) as we shall study, among others, the
case of negative cross-e?ects where investments are ‘anti-cooperative’. Some authors (e.g. Noldeke and
Schmidt, 1995) also use the term ‘investments with externalities.’
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?e
definition, the self-e?ect is positive (negative) whenever the new technology reduces (in-
creases) cost, and the cross-e?ect is positive (negative) if the new technology produces
a good of higher (lower) value to the buyer. If there were no cross-e?ects, the case of
negative self-e?ects would be trivial – the seller would never purchase a technology that
raises production costs. However, in the presence of cross-e?ects, a new technology may
be worth investing if it involves either (i) positive self- and cross-e?ects, or (ii) negative
cross-e?ects and positive self-e?ects, or (iii) negative self-e?ects and positive cross-e?ects.
A cost-reducing technology may imply lower quality and therefore lower buyer’s value
(case (ii)); similarly, a new technology for producing higher quality may also involve
higher operating costs (case (iii)). Hence, once the cross-e?ects are present, it is worth
studying the case of negative cross-e?ects (ii) as well as the case of negative self-e?ects
(iii). Moreover, if the buyer also makes a specific investment, there can be situations
where cross-e?ects of the parties have di?erent strength (relative to self-e?ects) and even
opposite signs.
Our main research question is whether the first best can be implemented in this
general setting through various contractual arrangements such as simple non-contingent
contracts, general revelation mechanisms, option contracts and property rights. We show
that providing e?cient incentives for two investing parties is very di?cult even if the
cross-e?ects are negative. The first best is implemented only if the strength of cross-e?ects
relative to self-e?ects is perfectly symmetric across parties (or, for some mechanisms, at
least su ciently symmetric).
In order to compare the performance of di?erent mechanisms, we consider a simple
framework of mutual “tax rates”, i.e. shares of each party’s ex post gains of trade to
be paid as a “tax” to the other party. Such an arrangement is similar to the contract
between two jointly operating buccaneer vessels in the late 17th century:
“... These articles contained the common provisions that ... the vessel
taking a prize should retain three fifths of its [the prize’s] values, surrendering
two fifths to its associate.”
Rafael Sabatini, Captain Blood, chapter 13.
Since the cross-e?ects are essentially externalities, “taxes” can indeed restore e?-
ciency. We show that in the generic case there exists a unique pair of tax rates that
provides the first best incentives to both parties. However, since the contracts are incom-
plete, the gains of trade cannot be directly contracted upon. Implementing an arbitrary
pair of tax rates is therefore a di?cult task. We decompose the problem into two stages.
First, we establish a correspondence between incentives to be provided and the tax rates.
Second, for each particular class of contractual arrangements we find the range of tax
rates that can be implemented.
We start with a very simple model where parties can trade only one unit of good;
also, we rule out the problem of renegotiation-proofness by assuming that trade is always
?cient. Even in this setting, the analysis is not trivial. The first best can only be
achieved when cross-e?ects are negative and perfectly (or at least su?ciently) symmetric.
We then extend our analysis to the setting where parties can trade any positive quantity.
The set of ex ante contracts is expanded to include those that specify trade levels well
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in excess of the ex post e?cient volumes. It turns out, however, that even in this case,
the first best is hard to implement. The only di?erence is that in addition to the case of
negative cross-e?ects, the e?cient incentives can also be provided if the cross-e?ects are
positive but weaker than self-e?ects. The symmetry constraint remains important.
This paper also contributes to answering the question posed by Che and Hausch
(1999): can property rights help to provide incentives for cross-investments?2 We show
that optimal allocation of property rights does outperform contracts. Property rights
shift incentives from one party to another and therefore partially relax the symmetry
constraint. We show that the optimal allocation of property rights implements the first
best when cross-e?ects are negative and su?ciently symmetric, and study the second
best when the first best cannot be achieved.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce a simple model of
bilateral trade where only one unit can be traded. We prove that in the presence of
cross-e?ects contracting has no value if cross-e?ects are stronger than self-e?ects. We
also calculate the optimal tax rates and show how they depend upon the signs and
relative strength of cross-e?ects. In Section 3, we study whether the first best can be
implemented through a general message contingent mechanism (Subsection 3.1), option
contracts (3.2), and property rights (3.3). We also characterize the second best. Section
4 extends the analysis to a setting with continuous quantity. Section 5 concludes.
?
2 The model
2.1 The setting
Consider a simple bilateral trade setting. At time t = 0, two agents, a buyer B and
a seller S, contemplate trading a unit of good that originally belongs to the seller. At
time t = 1/2, the buyer and the seller make relationship-specific investments ? ? 0,
? ? 0, respectively. Once made, the investments are sunk and have no value outside
the relationship. At time t = 1, both parties observe the state of nature ? ? ?, the
seller’s production cost c(?,?,?) and the buyer’s valuation of the good v(?,?,?). Then
the parties renegotiate whether to trade and at what price. If the trade occurs, the price
p is determined either by a contract signed at time t = 0 or through bargaining at t = 1.
The seller’s payo? is p? c(?,?,?)?? and the buyer’s is ?p+ v(?, ?,?)??. If no trade
occurs, the payo?s are ?? and ??, correspondingly. Parties choose their investment
levels simultaneously and independently. The probability distribution of ? is common
knowledge at t = 0. The distribution does not have mass points, the density function
f(?) is well-defined. The state set ? is a path-connected subset of Rn.
We assume that the trade is always e cient:
c(?,?,?) ? v(?,?,?) for all ?,? and ?. (1)
2This problem is also studied by Edlin and Hermalin (2000) but their setting is di?erent. First,
they study sequential rather than simultaneous investments, which makes it easier to design an optimal
mechanism (Demsky and Sappington, 1991, Noldeke and Schmidt, 1998). Second, in their setting, the
self- and cross-e?ects of investments cannot be explicitly defined: investments increase ex post returns
to the owner of the asset. Hence, cross-e?ects are present only if the asset changes hands.
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1
Observe realization ?,
bargain and tradeInvest ?,?Contract
0 1/2
Figure 1: The timeline.
The total ex post gains of trade w(?, ?,?) = v(?,?,?) ? c(?,?,?) are always non-
negative. The first-best choice of ?,? maximizes the total expected gains of trade
W (?,?) = Ew(?,?,?) minus the cost of investment:
(??,??) = arg max
?,??0
{W (?,?)? ? ? ?} .
?
(2)
Since trading is e cient, there exists a price p¯ such that both parties’ expected gains of
trade are non-negative: Ev(?,??,??)? p¯ ? 0 and S(??,??) = p¯?Ec(?, ??,??) ? 0. Let
us introduce the gains of trade at the price p¯:
b(?, ?,?) = v(?,?,?)? p¯, s(?,?,?) = p¯? c(?, ?,?) (3)
and the expected gains of trade: B(?,?) = Eb(?,?,?); S(?,?) = Es(?,?,?). Through-
out the paper we assume that courts can verify delivery, so the contract specifying trade
at price p¯ is enforced even though in some states it may provide one party with a negative
payo? (e.g. b < 0 or s < 0 for some ?).
The parties’ gains of trade (b, s) are distributed on BxS, where B = {b(?,?,?) :
? ? ?,? ? 0,? ? 0}, S = {s(?, ?,?) : ? ? ?,? ? 0,? ? 0}.
We will make the following technical assumptions: both s(?,?,?) and b(?,?,?) are
strictly concave and continuously di?erentiable for ? ? 0,? ? 0 and twice continuously
di?erentiable for all ? > 0,? > 0. Therefore B(?,?) and S(?,?) are strictly concave and
continuously di?erentiable for ? ? 0,? ? 0 and twice continuously di?erentiable for all
? > 0,? > 0 i.e. B?? < 0, S?? < 0, B?? < 0, S?? < 0.3 For simplicity’s sake, we rule out
complementarities: B?? = S?? = 0. Then, gains of tradeW (?,?) = B(?,?)+S(?,?) and
total ex ante welfareW (?,?)???? are also concave. For the sake of simplicity we shall
also assume Inada conditions: W?(0,?) = W?(?, 0) = W?(0,?) = W?(?, 0) = ? and
W?(?,?) = W?(?,?) = W?(?,?) = W?(?,?) = 0. Therefore, the first-best choice
of investment levels (??,??) is unique, non-trivial and can be found from the first order
conditions
W?(??,??) = 1, W?(??,??) = 1. (4)
3Most results below can be reformulated without concavity assumptions using strict monotone com-
parative statics techniques. For clarity’s sake we shall use first-order conditions throughout the paper.
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?The total e?ect of the buyer’s investment is the sum of self- and cross- e?ects: W? =
B? + S?. There can be three cases: (i) both self- and cross-e?ects are non-negative in
the first-best: B?? ? B?(??,??) ? 0, S?? ? S?(??,??) ? 0; (ii) self-e?ect is positive while
cross-e?ect is negative: B?? > 0, S?? < 0; (iii) self-e?ect is negative while the cross-e?ect
is positive: B?? < 0, S
?
? > 0. To simplify, we assume below that the e?ects do not change
signs, i.e. “negative cross-e?ects of buyer’s investments” will mean S? > 0 for all ?,? ? 0
rather than only in the first best.
Throughout the paper we assume equal bargaining power.
Remark 1 We have made two restrictive assumptions. First, the trade is binary, sec-
ond, the trade is always e?cient. Under these assumptions, parties cannot contract on
quantities that are above the ex post e cient level of trade q? = 1.4 Also, the assumptions
allow for writing a renegotiation-proof contract (‘trade one unit at price p’) which rules
out the hold-up problem. Both assumptions are relaxed in Section 4.
2.2 Benchmarks
2.2.1 Null contract
Let us first describe the choice of investments at t = 1/2 if no arrangements are made ex
ante (at t = 0). We will refer to this mechanism as the “null contract” (Che and Hausch,
1999, call it the “Williamsonian outcome”).
At t = 1, the parties observe the state of nature and gains of trade v(?, ?,?) ?
c(?, ?,?) and bargain on the division of the joint surplus. Equal allocation of bargaining
power implies p = (v+c)/2. Anticipating this outcome, the buyer chooses ? to maximize
1
2
W (?,?)??, and the seller chooses ? to maximize 1
2
W (?,?)??. Under the assumptions
above, the equilibrium levels of investments can be found from the first-order conditions
W? = 2, W? = 2. (5)
Comparing (5) to (4), we obtain that null contract is never e?cient. Each party only
gets half of the social returns to her investment, and has incentives to underinvest.
2.2.2 Non-contingent contract
Suppose that at t = 0 the parties sign a contract to trade at price p¯ at time t = 1. Since p¯
is observable and verifiable, the contract can be enforced. The contract is renegotiation-
proof: since the trade is ex post e?cient (1), renegotiation cannot increase joint surplus.
The contract is still incomplete since it is not contingent on the payo?-relevant variables
v and c. The incompleteness is crucial whenever cross-e?ects are present. Indeed, under
the non-contingent contract, the buyer will choose ? to maximize B(?,?) ? ? and the
4Certainly, in many applications the level of trade is indeed binary. Consider a situation where a
certain service is either provided or not provided. Parties care only about the service’s quality which is
not verifiable.
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seller will choose ? to maximize S(?,?)??. The equilibrium investment levels are found
from the first-order conditions:
B? = 1, S? = 1.
?
?
?
(6)
If there were no cross-e?ects of investments, i.e. B?? = S?? = 0, the conditions (6) would
be the same as (4); the non-contingent contract would implement the first best. It is no
longer true in the presence of cross-e?ects. Giving up all the change in v to the buyer,
the seller does not care anymore about the e?ect of her investment on v. But is it more
ine?cient than the null contract? Intuitively, the advantage of the null contract is that
it provides parties with non-trivial incentives to care about cross-e?ects. However, it
expropriates half of the self-e?ects in favor of the other party. Hence, the null contract
should be more e?cient when the cross-e?ects are strong relative to the self-e?ects, and
the non-contingent contract should be more e?cient when the self-e?ects are stronger.
Hence, if the cross-e?ects are strong enough, the parties prefer to scrap the contract
although it is e?cient and renegotiation-proof ex post.5
To summarize the above discussion, we establish the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 Under the assumptions above the following is true.
1. The non-contingent contract is e cient if and only if there are no cross-e?ects
B?? = S
?
? = 0.
6
2. The null contract is never e cient. However, if cross-e?ects are stronger than
self-e?ects (S? > B?, B? > S? for all ? and ?), the null contract is more e?-
cient than the non-contingent contract. If cross-e?ects are weaker but still posi-
tive B? > S? > 0, S? > B? > 0 then the null contract is less e?cient than the
non-contingent contract. If cross-e?ects and self-e?ects are of the same magnitude
S? = B? and B? = S? then the null contract and the non-contingent contract are
equally ine?cient.
Similarly to Che and Hausch (1999), we find that contracting has no value if cross-
e?ects are su?ciently strong (in our setting, cross-e?ects must be stronger than self-
e?ects). The intuition is straightforward: the non-contingent contract results in a more
severe underinvestment than the null contract. The Proposition does not cover the case
of negative cross-e?ects. In that case, the null contract results in underinvestment while
the non-contingent contract provides incentives to overinvest, and it is hard to establish
which outcome is less ine?cient.
2.2.3 The optimal tax rates
In the presence of non-trivial cross-e?ects, the non-contingent contract is ine cient, since
it does not provide parties with any share in other party’s ex post gains. Suppose that
5In the risk-neutral framework, a more e?cient outcome is unanimously preferred by both parties ex
ante. They can redistribute the welfare gains through transfers at t = 0.
6The ‘if’ part has been shown in a more general framework by many authors. The ‘only if’ part has
also been discussed in the literature (e.g. MacLeod and Malcolmson, 1993).
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there exists a mechanism that gives ?b per cent of the seller’s surplus to the buyer, and
?s per cent of the buyer’s surplus to the seller. In this Subsection, we assume that such a
mechanism can be implemented and solve for ?b and ?s that provide optimal incentives.
In the next Section we show which pairs ?b and ?s can be implemented in di?erent
settings.
The rates ?b and ?s may be understood as “tax rates” (to o?set the “externalities”
due to cross-e?ects): the buyer’s gains of trade B are being “taxed” at the rate ?s
and the seller’s – at the rate ?b. The budget is balanced: tax on one party is paid to
the other one. The buyer’s expected payo? is (1 ? ?s)B + ?bS ? ? and the seller’s is
(1 ? ?b)S + ?sB ? ?. Notice that at ?b = ?s = 1/2 we obtain the null contract. The
non-contingent contract is equivalent to ?b = ?s = 0. The investments are determined
by the first-order conditions:
(1? ?s)B? + ?bS? = 1; (1? ?b)S? + ?sB? = 1. (7)
Using these two equations, we can calculate the tax rates ?b and ?s that provide e?cient
incentives.
Lemma 1 If S?? + B
?
? 6 = 1 then the tax rates ?b,?s provide first best incentives if and
only if
?b =
B??
S?? +B
?
? ? 1
, ?s =
S??
S?? +B
?
? ? 1
. (8)
?
If S?? = B
?
? = 1/2 then the first best is achieved if and only if ?b = ?s = 1/2. If
S?? = 1?B?? 6 = 1/2 there are no ?b,?s that provide e cient incentives.
The Lemma has a number implications that are important for the analysis below.
Corollary 1 The formulae (8) define a mapping of (S??, B
?
?) to (?b,?s) with the following
properties.
1. The mapping is reflexive: B?? =
?b
?b+?s?1
, S?? =
?s
?b+?s?1
.
2. The mapping transforms the space of parameters (S??, B
?
?) to the space (?b,?s) as
shown in Figure 2, in particular:
(a) The tax rates ?b,?s (8) satisfy ?b,?s ? 0, ?b + ?s ? 1 if and only if both
cross-e?ects are non-positive in the first-best: S?? ? 0 and B?? ? 0 (domains
G,H,I in Figure 2).
(b) The tax rates ?b,?s (8) satisfy ?b ? [0, 1/2],?s ? [0, 1/2] if and only if
both cross-e?ects are non-positive and su?ciently symmetric S?? ? 0, B?? ?
0,
¯
S?? ?B??
¯
? 1 (domain H in Figure 2).
3. The tax rates ?b,?s are perfectly symmetric ?b = ?s if and only if the cross-e?ects
are perfectly symmetric S?? = B
?
?.
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Figure 2: Optimal tax rates ?b,?s as a function of cross-e?ects in the first best S??, B??.
The left-hand side graph partitions the space of parameters S?? and B
?
? into nine domains
A,B, ..., I. The right-hand side graph maps the partition onto the space of tax rates
?b,?s.
The Corollary implies that (a) symmetry in cross-e?ects requires symmetry in tax
rates, and (b) there is a relationship between sign and strength of cross-e?ects and those
of the tax rates. Consider the case where cross-e?ects are on average weaker than self-
e?ects S?? +B?? < B?? +S?? (hence S?? +B?? < 1, domains D-I in Fig.2). In domain D, the
buyer’s cross-e?ect is positive and seller’s cross-e?ect is negative. The buyer receives a
positive tax ?b > 0 from the seller to restore incentives. The tax that the buyer pays on
her own gain is negative ?s < 0 : the seller’s investment reduces buyer’s gain B, so the
seller should pay for a negative externality.
Remark 2 In this Section, we only consider linear taxes. The analysis can be generalized
to include the optimal non-linear tax schedules. The only di?erence is that formulas (8)
should describe marginal tax rates calculated at the equilibrium choice of investments.
3 Optimal mechanisms
3.1 Message-contingent mechanisms
In this Section we study the performance of message-contingent mechanisms. At t = 0,
parties sign an agreement to make payments and deliveries contingent on messages posted
8
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at t = 1. Messages are observable and verifiable. At t = 1, parties observe v and c and
report b = v ? p¯ and s = p¯ ? c.7 We shall denote the buyer’s reports of b and s by
bB, sB, and the seller’s reports by bS, sS, respectively.
Given bB, sB, bS, sS, the mechanism specifies payments of T (bB, sB, bS, sS) by the
buyer to the seller (T can be either positive or negative); with probability X(bB,sB,bS,sS)
the parties trade one unit at price p(bB, sB, bS, sS) (on top of the payment of T ); with
probability 1 ? X(bB,sB,bS,sS) parties do not trade. After the mechanism is played,
parties can renegotiate.
We only consider budget-balanced mechanisms that include no payments to a third
party. The first best could be easily implemented through unbalanced mechanisms, e.g.
via subgame perfect implementation (see a survey in Moore, 1992) or even via a “shoot-
them-all” game (similar to one in Maskin, 1999). If parties’ reports on b, s di?er, the
parties pay large fines to the third party. If the reports match, parties get the payo?s
(1??s)bB +?bsB and (1??b)sB +?sbB, where ?b,?s are given by (8). The e?ciency of
“shooting-them-all” is well-known; in particular, Che and Hausch (1999) show in Section
IV that it helps to provide first best incentives for cooperative investment. The problem
with the “shoot-them-all” mechanism (as well as with other non-balanced mechanisms)
is that it is not collusion-proof: at least one party always prefers to bribe the third party.
The renegotiation occurs only if the mechanism prescribes no trade. Parties split the
trade gains according to Nash bargaining solution. Hence, at t = 1, the buyer’s and the
seller’s payo?s are, respectively:
UB(bB, sB, bS, sS, b, s) = X(bB, sB, bS, sS)[b+ p¯? p(bB, sB, bS, sS)]+
+
¡
1?X(bB, sB, bS, sS)
¢
[b+ s]/2? T (bB, sB, bS, sS),
US(bB, sB, bS, sS, b, s) = X(bB, sB, bS, sS)[s+ p(bB, sB, bS, sS)? p¯]+
+
¡
1?X(bB, sB, bS, sS)
¢
[b+ s]/2 + T (bB, sB, bS, sS)
Definition 1 A mechanism {X, p, T} is said to implement a surplus division ruleK(·, ·) :
BxS ? R if for every pair b ? B, s ? S there exist such b¯B, b¯S ? B, s¯B, s¯S ? S that
K(b, s) = UB(b¯B, s¯B, b¯S, s¯S, b, s); b + s ? K(b, s) = US(b¯B, s¯B, b¯S, s¯S, b, s) and for all
bB, sB, bS, sS the following inequalities hold
UB(b¯B, s¯B, b¯S, s¯S, b, s) ? UB(bB, sB, b¯S, s¯S, b, s),
US(b¯B, s¯B, b¯S, s¯S, b, s) ? US(b¯B, s¯B, bS, sS, b, s).
The mechanism design problem is now decomposed into (i) selecting a surplus division
rule K as a function of true b and s : (b, s)? {K(b, s), b+ s?K(b, s)} and (ii) choosing
such {X, p, T} that K is implementable via Nash equilibrium in the message game. In
order to provide incentives for e?cient investments, the function K(b, s) should satisfy
?? ? Argmax
??0
EK(b(?,?,??), s(?, ?,??))? ?,
?? ? Argmax
??0
W (??,?)?EK(b(?,??,?), s(?, ??,?))? ?.
7We describe the state in terms of parties gains of trade b, s rather than the valuations v, c to make
notation symmetric.
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Similarly to Moore (1992), one can easily prove that K(b, s) is implementable if and only
if it is implementable via truthful revelation. We shall restrict our analysis to the Nash
equilibria with b¯B = b¯S = b, s¯B = s¯S = s.
Lemma 2 A surplus division rule K(b, s) is truthfully implementable only if for all ? ?
0, b ? B and s ? S
?/2 ? K(b+?, s)?K(b, s) ? ? (9)
0 ? K(b, s+?)?K(b, s) ? ?/2 (10)
K(b+?, s+?)?K(b, s) = ? (11)
?
Proposition 2 Under the assumptions above the following results hold:
1. If both cross-e?ects are symmetric and non-positive in the first best B?? = S?? ? 0,
then there exists a mechanism that implements e cient choice of investments.
2. If either of the conditions below holds, no message-contingent mechanism can im-
plement the first best.8
(a) The cross-e?ect of the buyer’s investment is positive in the first best in all
states of nature i.e. s?(?, ??,??) > 0 for all ?, and the total e?ect of buyer’s
investment does not change sign across states w?(?,??,??) > 0 for all ?.
(b) The buyer’s cross-e?ect is stronger than the seller’s cross-e?ect and the buyer’s
self-e?ect is weaker than the seller’s in the first best in all states of nature
i.e. there exist such ?1, ?2 > 0 such that s?(?, ??,??) ? b?(?,?) ? ?1 and
s?(?, ??,??)? b?(?,??,??) ? ?2, for all ?.
3. If cross-e?ects are positive and stronger than self-e?ects s? > b?, b? > s? for all
?, ? and ?, then the second best can be implemented through a null contract.
4. If cross-e?ects are positive but are weaker than self-e?ects 0 < s? < b?, 0 < b? < s?
for all ?,? and ?, then the second best can be implemented through a non-contingent
contract.
The Proposition makes two negative statements. The first best cannot be achieved if
cross-e?ects are either positive (condition 2a) or non-symmetric (condition 2b). To prove
the statement 2a, we also need a technical assumption w?(?, ??,??) > 0. It requires that
the e?ect of investment on the total surplus is su?ciently uniformly distributed across
states; on average, it is positive and equals one: Ew? =W
?
? = 1.
Proposition 2 also establishes a relationship between the strength of cross-e?ects and
the value of contracting. If cross-e?ects are positive but weaker than self-e?ects, then the
availability of the non-contingent contract is valuable. Although the first best cannot be
achieved, in the second best parties trade according to the non-contingent contract with
positive probability. If the cross-e?ects are very strong (stronger than the self-e?ects),
the second best message game never makes use of the non-contingent contract.
8For the brevity’s sake, conditions (a) and (b) are formulated for the buyer’s investment. Respective
conditions can be stated for the seller’s investment as well.
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Remark 3 The symmetry constraint is not important if only one party invests. Our
assumptions require non-trivial investment by each party, so formally our analysis does
not cover the case of one-sided investment. Still, it is clear how to provide incentives for
such investment. Suppose that the buyer does not invest. Then one needs to implement
?b,?s that solve only the second equation in (7). There are just enough degrees of freedom
to find such tax rates even if the symmetry constraint ?b = ?s is binding. The first best
can therefore be implemented for any negative B?? through ?b = ?s =
B??
2B???1
.
3.2 Option contracts
In this Section, we study what tax rates can be implemented through simpler mechanisms
such as option contracts. Noldeke and Schmidt (1995) have shown that option contracts
solve the hold-up problem if investments do not have cross-e?ects. In concluding remarks,
Noldeke and Schmidt argue that options should also provide e?cient incentives if only
one party’s investment has cross-e?ects and doubt that option contracts can do well in
case of two-sided cross-investments. The main distinction from their work is that we
study self- and cross-investments made by two parties.
Consider the following arrangement. At time t = 0, the parties trade option contracts.
The seller gets a right to sell the good to the buyer at time t = 1 at price ps even if the
buyer does not want to take it. This is the so called “take-or-pay” or “minimum bill”
clause (Masten, 1996, provides many examples). In the meanwhile, the buyer gets a right
to oblige the seller to deliver the good at time t = 1 at price pb > ps. At t = 1, parties
bargain and conclude a spot contract keeping the option contracts in mind.
The option swap is equivalent to “minimum-maximum price limits” clauses in the
contract or to a “flexible indexed contract” (i.e. the contract where parties agree on a
verifiable price index and allow for certain upward and downward deviations from the
index). These arrangements are very common in relationships between suppliers and
customers in coal and petroleum coke industries (Joskow, 1987, 1990, and Goldberg and
Erickson, 1987).
In the analysis of the option contracts, the structure of the bargaining solution be-
comes crucial. We contrast two approaches (mnemonic names as in to Binmore et al.,
1989): “deal-me-out” (or the outside option principle) and “split-the-di?erence” (Nash
bargaining solution with options as threatpoints). The di?erence between the two is
similar to the di?erence between Hart’s model of asset ownership and the one in Chiu
(1998) and De Meza and Lockwood (1998). While Binmore et al. (1989) show that
the deal-me-out solution performs better in the experiments, both bargaining solutions
may occur in real life. Goldberg and Erickson (1987) argue that the deal-me-out model
seems to be consistent with evidence on the petroleum coke contracts after 1973, while
the model where options serve as disagreement points, seems to be more applicable to
pre-1973 contracts. Below, we analyze the two bargaining solutions one by one.
3.2.1 Outside option principle (‘deal-me-out’)
Suppose that at t = 1 parties engage in an alternating o?er game as described in Osborne
and Rubinstein (1990); each o?er takes a round, and there is a positive though very small
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discount rate ? per round (or a very small probability of an exogenous termination of
bargaining). Each party can exercise her option at any moment during the game (if both
party want to exercise their options simultaneously, one of them prevails with probability
1/2; this outcome does not occur in equilibrium). As described in Binmore et al. (1989),
there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium that converges to the following outcome
as ? ? 0. Both parties know that if there were no option contracts, the price would be
set at p = (v+ c)/2. If this price is below ps, the seller will not engage in bargaining but
will simply exercise her option to sell at ps right away. If (v + c)/2 > pb then the buyer
will want to exercise her option and oblige the seller to sell the good at pb.
The buyer’s expected payo? is B ? 1/2
R
(v+c)/2?[ps,pb](b? s)f(?)d? +
R
(v+c)/2<ps
(p¯?
ps)f(?)d??
R
(v+c)/2>pb
(pb? p¯)f(?)d?, the seller’s is S+1/2
R
(v+c)/2?[ps,pb](b?s)f(?)d??R
(v+c)/2<ps
(p¯? ps)f(?)d?+
R
(v+c)/2>pb
(pb ? p¯)f(?)d?. The first-order conditions for the
parties’ investment levels are as follows:9
B? + 1/2
Z
(v+c)/2?[ps,pb]
(?b? + s?)f(?)d? = 1,
S? + 1/2
Z
(v+c)/2?[ps,pb]
(b? ? s?)f(?)d? = 1.
In terms of incentives, this solution is similar to a combination of the non-contingent
contract and the null contract. In some states of nature (whenever (v + c)/2 /? [ps, pb])
parties trade at a fixed price (either ps or pb) and care only about self-e?ects. In other
states, parties get their Nash bargaining solution payo?s (v? c)/2 and receive one half of
the social return to investment. The option prices ps, pb determine the relative weights
of the non-contingent contract and the null contract. If ps and pb are very close to each
other, then the weight of the non-contingent contract is high and that of the null contract
is low. If ps is very small and pb is very large, the choice of investments will be similar
to the one under the null contract (5) rather than the non-contingent contract (6).
Proposition 3 Let the shock ? be multiplicative, v(?, ?,?) = ?(?)v¯(?,?) and c(?, ?,?) =
?(?)c¯(?,?). Assume that ? is continuously distributed over [0, 1] and ?(·) is a continu-
ous increasing function. Then, for any (?,?) that solve (7) for some ?b = ?s ? [0, 1/2],
there exist such ps, pb that the option swap (ps, pb) implements (?,?). In particular, if
cross-e?ects are non-positive and perfectly symmetric B?? = S?? ? 0 then there exist such
ps, pb that the option swap implements the first best.
Therefore, if the outside option principle holds, option contracts can only implement
the tax rates ?b = ?s ? [0, 1/2]. Although there are two parameters ps, pb, there is only
one degree of freedom (at most one option can bind). Greater ps as well as lower pb
increase both ?b and ?s simultaneously. One cannot reward cross-e?ects independently.
An option contract is e?ectively a message game where the outcome is contingent on
the announcement of state of nature by one party. Hence it is not surprising that options
9The density is finite, hence the terms proportional to changes in the integration limits cancel out
in the first order conditions. The e?ect of investments on the probability to make the option bind is
negligible.
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cannot outperform the general message contingent mechanism. It is rather remarkable
though that if the shock is multiplicative, then options perform as well as the general
mechanisms.
3.2.2 Nash bargaining solution (‘split-the-di?erence’)
The outside option principle predicts that the option contracts are actually exercised with
a non-trivial probability 1 ? Prob(ps ? (v + c)/2 ? pb). This is consistent with Gold-
berg and Erickson’s (1987) account of the petroleum coke contracts after 1973 (“parties
expected that the boundaries would routinely be reached”). However, before 1973, the
minimum and maximum price limits “served a completely di?erent function” (Goldberg
and Erickson, 1987). In particular, the actual price was very rarely set equal to the
limits specified in the contracts. In this Subsection we consider an alternative model of
bargaining where the maximum and minimum limits are e?ectively used as threatpoints
in renegotiation; the price does not reach the limits in equilibrium.
In order to explain how the split-the-di?erence rule can emerge as a subgame perfect
equilibrium in a bargaining game, we consider an alternating o?er game with the risk of
breakdown and two options.10 At t = 1 parties play an infinite horizon alternating o?er
game with a small probability of termination ? in each round. There is no discounting.
In each round, one party makes an o?er to trade at certain price p. If the other party
agrees, trade at this price occurs and the game ends. If the other party disagrees, a
random shock arrives. With probability ? the bargaining breaks down, with probability
1?? the game continues. The breakdown of negotiations can be interpreted as the urgent
need of a party to attend to other issues. Once this party leaves, the other party can
choose either not to trade or to exercise her option.
Unlike the setting in the previous subsection, options can be exercised not only dur-
ing the game but also after exogenous termination. This e?ectively turns options into
disagreement outcomes. The split-the-di?erence solution is based on the assumption that
making an o?er takes time, while accepting or rejecting an o?er and exercising an option
take no time. Technically, making an o?er is writing a contract while exercising an option
is essentially accepting a contract that has already been written. Exercising an option
is therefore similar to accepting an o?er; it is less time-consuming and does not require
participation of the other party. This is why if the negotiations break down, there is no
time to make another countero?er, but there is time to exercise the option contract.
Straightforward calculations prove that there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium
which converges to p =
¡
min{v, pb}+max{c, ps}¢ /2 as ? ? 0. The trade occurs in the
first round with equilibrium price p being always between ps and pb.
The intuition is as follows: when the buyer quits, the seller can either choose not
to trade leaving both parties with trivial payo?s or to exercise her option and get ps ?
c. Similarly, when the seller has to quit, the buyer chooses between v ? pb and zero.
Each party can exercise her option contract at any time, but she does not until the
other party leaves. is based on the assumption that making an o?er takes time, while
10There may be other settings that generate the same bargaining solution. E.g. analysis of inside
options (Muthoo, 1999) also results in the split-the-di?erence solution.
13
Guriev: Incomplete Contracts with Cross-Investments
Brought to you by | Fondation Nationale Des Sciences Politiq
Authenticated
Download Date | 4/28/15 10:31 AM
accepting/rejecting an o?er or exercising an option takes no time.
In equilibrium, the buyer gets v ?
¡
min{v, pb}+max{c, ps}¢ /2 and the seller gets¡
min{v, pb}+max{c, ps}¢ /2? c. The parties’ choice of investments is given by
B? ? 1/2
Z
v?pb
b?f(?)d? + 1/2
Z
ps?c
s?f(?)d? = 1, (12)
S? + 1/2
Z
v?pb
b?f(?)d? ? 1/2
Z
ps?c
s?f(?)d? = 1.
These conditions are very di?erent from those derived under the outside option principle.
The option prices ps and pb can be used to reward parties’ cross-e?ects independently.
An increase in pb encourages both the buyer and the seller to care about buyer’s utility v
while a decrease in ps provides incentives to invest in cost reduction. There are essentially
two degrees of freedom.
Proposition 4 Let the shock ? be separably multiplicative, i.e. ? = (?1,?2), v(?,?,?) =
?(?1)v¯(?,?) and c(?,?,?) = µ(?2)c¯(?,?). Assume that ?1,?2 are continuously (not
necessarily independently) distributed over [0, 1] and ?(·), µ(·) are continuous increas-
ing functions. Then for any (?,?) that solve (7) for some ?b ? [0, 1/2], ?s ? [0, 1/2],
there exist such ps, pb that the option swap (ps, pb) implements (?,?). In particular, if the
cross-e?ects are non-positive B?? ? 0, S?? ? 0 and su?ciently symmetric
¯
B?? ? S??
¯
? 1
then there exist such ps, pb that the option swap implements the first best.
In order to compare Propositions 3 and 4, let us assume ?1 = ?2 = ? and ?(?) =
µ(?) = ?(?). In this case both Propositions hold and we indeed see that under the
split-the-di?erence solution, the set of implementable tax rates is much broader: it is
[0, 1/2]x[0, 1/2] (domain H in the Figure 2) instead of ?b = ?s ? [0, 1/2]. There is also
a similarity between the two results: in both cases, the optimal distance between the
price limits pb and ps increases in the strength of cross-e?ects. If the cross-e?ects are
absent, then pb = ps attains the first best. Goldberg and Erickson (1987) report that
(pb ? ps)/ps varies from 30% to 100%, hence, cross-e?ects seem to be quite important in
the petroleum coke industry.
Under the split-the-di?erence solution, options outperform the message-contingent
mechanisms in Subsection 3.1 (which do not provide incentives for asymmetric cross-
e?ects). In terms of Maskin and Moore (1999), the settings in subsections 3.1 and 3.2.2
are two di?erent message games: although the mechanism design problem is the same, the
renegotiation functions are di?erent. The renegotiation function in 3.2.2 provides more
degrees of freedom. In particular, parties can e?ectively manipulate ex post bargaining
to achieve an asymmetric division of ex post surplus.
Remark 4 While two option contracts are essential to provide two degrees of freedom,
one does not need to use both at the same time. One can easily show that the pairs of
tax rates ?b,?s ? [0, 1/2] such that ?b ? ?s (?s ? ?b) can be implemented through the
buyer’s (the seller’s) option only.
14
Contributions to Theoretical Economics , Vol. 3 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 5
Brought to you by | Fondation Nationale Des Sciences Politiq
Authenticated
Download Date | 4/28/15 10:31 AM
3.3 Property rights
In this Subsection we consider a special case, where there is a alienable physical asset
perfectly complementary to the relationship-specific investment. Allocation of property
rights for such an asset can shift disagreement points in ex post bargaining. By reinforcing
bargaining position of the asset owner at the expense of the other party, property rights
can implement asymmetric tax rates.
Suppose that the buyer owns the asset at t = 0. Following Hart (1995) or Maskin and
Tirole (1999), we assume that the buyer can threaten to leave the relationship and trade
with an outside seller at t = 1. If the threat is implemented, S gets zero, while B gets
utility of v(?,?,?)? c(?, 0, 0). Here c(?, 0, 0) is the competitive price of an outside seller
who has made no specific investments. Having this threat in mind, B and S bargain on
the price p at t = 1. Equal bargaining power implies p = (c(?, 0, 0) + c(?,?,?)) /2.
For simplicity’s sake we assume throughout this Section that v(?, ?,?)?c(?, 0, 0) ? 0,
and c(?, 0, 0) ? c(?,?,?) (and, symmetrically, v(?, 0, 0)?c(?, ?,?) ? 0 and v(?,?,?) ?
v(?, 0, 0)) for all ? and for the first-best and second-best couples of ?,?. The first
condition implies that the trade with an outside seller is still e?cient; the gain from
trade with the outside could also be described as the private value of self-consumption
of the asset by B (Maskin and Tirole, 1999). The second condition requires that S is
more e?cient than the outside seller; this condition is less innocent. Since we consider
negative cross-e?ects, the option of switching to an outside partner can be endogenously
binding. For simplicity’s sake, we rule this case out, even though studying the e?ect of
this option on the parties’ incentives is an interesting extention of our analysis.
Notice that we assume that cross-e?ects are embodied in the asset. If B keeps the asset
and trades with an outsider, S’s buyer-specific investment still a?ects B’s valuation of
the good. However, the cross-e?ects of B’s investment which are specific to S are wasted:
the cost of an outside seller is c(?, 0, 0) rather than c(?,?, 0).11 E.g. consider the Fisher
Body example (as discussed in Hart, 1995). Fishers invested in a physical technology
for producing car bodies highly specific to General Motors car design; however, Fishers’
skills to operate this technology were inalienable. Hence, if GM owned the physical assets
but contracted with another car body producer, the value would still be v(?,?,?) while
the cost would rise to c(?, 0, 0) ? c(?,?,?).
At t = 1/2 the buyer expects to get B + 1
2
S + 1
2
(p¯?Ec(?, 0, 0)) , and the seller gets
1
2
S? 1
2
(p¯?Ec(?, 0, 0)) . The incentives to invest are therefore equivalent to the case with
?b = 1/2,?s = 0 (compare to (7)).
Similarly, the seller’s ownership is equivalent to ?b = 0,?s = 1/2.
Parties can also agree to own the asset jointly. In this case, neither of them will be
11An alternative approach would be to assume that investments are specific to the investing party
and bear fruit only if the investing party is present. In this case, the joint surplus from trading with an
outside seller would be v(?,?, 0)? c(?,?, 0) rather than v(?,?,?)? c(?, 0, 0). The choice between the
two alternative settings is only relevant in the presence of cross-e?ects; it has not been addressed in the
literature. We believe that our setting is more realistic; also, it is the one that is (implicitly) chosen by
Rosenkrantz and Schmitz (1999). In their model, if one of the investing parties leaves the relationship,
the total surplus (appropriated by the asset owner) still depends on her investment, even though it is
below the joint surplus in the presence of both investing parties.
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able to trade with outside parties (the other owner would veto outside deals), hence joint
ownership is simply equivalent to the case without property rights.
Property rights matter as long as there is scope for ex post renegotiation. If parties
sign the non-contingent renegotiation-proof contract ex ante, property rights become
irrelevant. In this section we consider a general mechanism where parties ex ante on
a verifiable partition of the state space ? into subsets ?N ,?C ,?b and ?s such that
Prob{? ? ?C} = ?, Prob{? ? ?b} = ?, Prob{? ? ?s} = ?, and Prob{? ? ?N} =
1 ? ? ? ? ? ?. Whenever ? ? ?N , parties have no contract and bargain ex post (joint
ownership without contracting); whenever ? ? ?C , parties can use the non-contingent
contract p = p; whenever ? ? ?b, the buyer gets ownership; and, whenever ? ? ?s, the
ownership is assigned to the seller.
This combination of property rights and contracting can also be implemented through
a mechanism similar to “stochastic ownership” (Hart, 1995). The parties agree that the
asset is given to the buyer with probability ?, given to the seller with probability ?. With
probability ?, parties trade at the non-contingent p. In the remaining contingencies, there
is neither a contract nor property rights (joint ownership without contracting) – this
outcome is equivalent to the null contract ?b = ?s = 1/2. The randomizing device is run
after the investments are made.12
The choice of investment is given by³
1?
?
2
´
B? +
?
2
S? = 1;
?
2
B? +
µ
1?
?
2
¶
S? = 1. (13)
The incentives to invest are therefore equivalent to those under ?b = ?/2,?s = ?/2.
Hence, contingent ownership can implement the tax rates ?b ? [0, 1/2],?s ? [0, 1/2].
This means that the first best can be achieved if and only if the cross-e?ects are negative
and su?ciently symmetric (part 2b of Corollary 1).
Proposition 5 A combination of stochastic ownership, joint ownership (null contract)
and the non-contingent contract achieves the first best if and only if the cross-e?ects are
non-positive B?? ? 0, S?? ? 0 and su?ciently symmetric
¯
B?? ? S??
¯
? 1.
In terms of Fig. 2, stochastic ownership implements the first best only for the range
of parameters H. For each pair of ?b,?s within domain H = [0, 1/2] × [0, 1/2], one
can find ?, ?, ? such that ?b = ?/2 and ?s = ?/2. Indeed, the area H is a convex
combination of the non-contingent contract (0, 0), the buyer’s ownership (1/2, 0), joint
ownership without contracting (1/2, 1/2), and the seller’s ownership (0, 1/2). Notice that
the first best includes at most three rather than four arrangements. The buyer’s (the
seller’s) ownership is not included in the optimal contract if ?b ? ?s (if ?b ? ?s), the
12Stochastic ownership can also be implemented via buyout options (Noldeke and Schmidt, 1998, or
Maskin and Tirole, 1999). At time t = 0 the parties own the asset jointly. They sign a fixed-price contract
but agree that it is only valid in some contingencies. It is agreed ex ante, that in other contingencies,
parties can use buyout options: the seller has an option to buy the asset out at time t = 4/6 at price
Ps, the buyer has an option to buy the asset out at time t = 5/6 at price Pb. Under certain assumptions
on the nature of uncertainty, there exist such Ps and Pb that the choice of investment is given by (13).
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non-contingent contract is never used if ?b + ?s ? 1/2, and null contract is excluded if
?b + ?s ? 1/2.
If the cross e?ects are negative, ownership is allocated away from the party with
stronger negative cross-e?ects (according to Proposition 5, the greater |S??|, the greater
?s, and the smaller ?). Also, if both parties have stronger negative cross-e?ects (larger |S??|
and |B??|), the joint ownership without contracting is used more and the non-contingent
contract is used less often (both ?b and ?s increase).
If the first best cannot be achieved, the parties choose ?b,?s ? [0, 1/2]× [0, 1/2] that
maximizeW????. The second best cannot belong to the interior of the squareH, hence,
the optimal arrangement is a combination of at most two outcomes: it is either a combi-
nation of vertical integration (ownership by one party) with the non-contingent contract,
or a combination of vertical integration with joint ownership (without contracting); it
can also be pure vertical integration, pure non-contingent contract (in this case property
rights have no value), or joint ownership without contracting (neither contracting nor
property rights have value).13 The following Proposition characterizes some properties
of the second best.
Proposition 6 The following statements hold.14
1. If both cross-e?ects and self-e?ects are positive, and cross-e?ects are su?ciently
weak S? > 0, B? > 0, B? > 0, S? > 0 and S?B? < B?S? for all ?,?, then the
second best is a combination of the non-contingent contract and vertical integration:
?b + ?s < 1/2.
2. If both cross-e?ects and self-e?ects are positive, and cross-e?ects are su?ciently
strong S? > 0, B? > 0, B? > 0, S? > 0 and S?B? > B?S? for all ?,?, then
the second best is a combination of vertical integration and joint ownership; the
non-contingent contract is never used ?b + ?s > 1/2.
3. If both self-e?ects are positive, the buyer’s cross-e?ect is positive and the seller’s
cross-e?ect is non-positive B? > 0, S? > 0, S? > 0 ? B? for all ?,?, then the
second best is either a combination of buyer’s ownership and joint ownership without
contracting, or a combination of buyer’s ownership and the non-contingent contract;
the seller never gets ownership ?b > ?s.
4. If both cross-e?ects are positive, the buyer’s self-e?ect is positive and the seller’s
self-e?ect is non-positive B? > 0 ? S?, S? > 0, B? > 0 for all ?,?, then the second
best is a combination of buyer’s ownership and joint ownership without contracting
13This suggests an interesting empirical distinction between negative and positive cross-e?ects. In the
situations where cross-e?ects are negative (and su?ciently symmetric), the optimal arrangement is more
complex – it involves three di?erent outcomes with positive probabilities. When at least one cross-e?ect
is positive, the second best is a border solution and includes at most two outcomes: with some probability
one party gets property rights, and in the remaining contingencies it is either non-contingent contract
or null contract (joint ownership).
14Parts 3 and 4 refer to the buyer’s investment. Similar statements for the seller’s investment can be
formulated and proven in a perfectly symmetric fashion.
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?b = 1/2, ?s ? [0, 1/2]. If both cross-e?ects are positive, and both self-e?ects
are non-positive, then the second best is pure joint ownership without contracting
?b = ?s = 1/2.
These results are similar to those obtained for the first best. The non-contingent
contract rewards self-e?ects, while the null contract rewards cross-e?ects. Whenever
cross-e?ects are stronger than self-e?ects, the non-contingent contract is not used. More-
over, if self-e?ects are trivial or negative, joint ownership without contracting dominates
all other arrangements; property rights have no value, nor does contracting.15 If only one
party has a positive cross-e?ect while the cross-e?ect of the other is trivial or negative,
the optimal mechanism includes ownership of the party with positive cross-e?ect. De-
pending on the strength of the cross-e?ect, the optimal arrangement also includes either
non-contingent contract or joint ownership.
Similarly to the option contracts under the split-the-di?erence bargaining solution,
property rights allow shifting the disagreement points in the ex post bargaining. This
allows property rights to outperform message-contingent games and to implement the
first best if cross-e?ects are negative and su?ciently (but not necessarily perfectly) sym-
metric. It is crucial that property rights help adjusting the disagreement points but not
the distribution of bargaining power. If bargaining power could be directly contracted
upon (e.g. through design of ex post renegotiation, Aghion et al., 1994), then the first
best would be implementable for any negative cross-e?ects; the symmetry constraint¯
B?? ? S??
¯
? 1 would be lifted. Indeed, arbitrary allocation of bargaining power would
allow to implement all ?b,?s such that ?b,?s ? 0,?b + ?s ? 1 (domains G,H, I in the
Fig.2).
Remark 5 The result that allocation of property rights achieves e?ciency only if cross-
e?ects are both negative and su?ciently symmetric, follows from the equal allocation of
bargaining power. Suppose that bargaining splits the surplus between buyer and seller in
proportion ? : 1 ? ?. Then the buyer’s ownership results in ?b = ?,?s = 0, the seller’s
ownership is equivalent to ?b = 0,?s = 1 ? ?, and joint ownership (null contract) is
simply ?b = ?,?s = 1 ? ?. Hence, contingent ownership can implement the first best if
and only if it can be achieved through ?b ? [0, ?],?s ? [0, 1? ?]. Using (8), we find that
the first best is achieved if and only if B?? ? 0, S?? ? 0 and ?? ? (1??)B????S?? ? 1??.
4 Continuous quantity
The analysis above assumes that the binary quantity choice: “trade” vs. “no trade”. This
e?ectively restricts the contractible level of trade by one unit. Any quantity between 0
and 1 could be implemented through a combination of the null contract and the non-
contingent contract; but parties cannot contract on quantities that are above one unit. In
this Section, we consider a setting where parties can trade any positive quantity at t = 1.
15This result is similar to the analysis of know-how disclosure arrangements by Rosenkranz and Schmitz
(1999) who show that importance of cross-e?ects makes joint ownership more e?cient than other own-
ership structures.
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More importantly, the quantity is verifiable ex post and can therefore be contracted
upon at t = 0. Although ex post renegotiation results in a quantity that maximizes
the total gains of trade, the contracts on quantity provide parties with a wide choice
of threatpoints (see Edlin and Reichelstein, 1996). It turns out that while the set of
implementable outcomes is indeed broader, the main insights still hold.
To make the analysis tractable, we will assume additive separability: the buyer’s
utility of consuming q units of the good is v(?,?,?)q+ev(?, q) , and the seller’s production
costs are c(?, ?,?)q + c(?, q). This form is similar to the ones considered in Edlin ande
Reichelstein (1996) and Segal and Whinston (2002). In both papers payo?s include yet
another term that depends upon investments and state of nature ?. In our setting, this
would make the analysis much more complex (Edlin and Reichelstein, 1996, do not allow
for cross-e?ects; Segal and Whinston, 2002, consider one-sided investments).
We shall also assume that for all ?,?,? the ex post e?cient quantity
q?(?, ?,?) , argmax
q?0
[v(?, ?,?)q + ev(?, q)? c(?,?,?)q ? ec(?, q)]
is finite. The first best choice of investment is given by (2) where the expected ex post
surplus isW (?,?) = Emaxq?0 [v(?, ?,?)q + v(?, q)? c(?, ?,?)q ?e ec(?, q)]. To make the
analysis comparable with that of the previous Section, we shall normalize quantity units
so that Eq?(?, ??,??) = 1.
Introduction of quantity contracts does not change the results of Section 2.2.3 which
determines the relationship between size and strength of cross-e?ects and the tax rates
that implement the first best. However, a broader set of contracts may allow di?erent
mechanisms to implement a larger range of tax rates. Below, we shall consider these
mechanisms one by one.
Non-contingent contract. A non-contingent contract obliges the seller to deliver q ? 0
units in exchange of the payment of p. At q = 0, the non-contingent contract becomes
the null contract.
The non-contingent contract is no longer renegotiation-proof: q 6 = q?(?, ?,?) for
almost all ?. Hence it will be renegotiated to q?(?,?,?), and the parties will split the
increase in joint surplus. Straightforward calculations yield the following expected ex
post payo?s for the buyer and the seller, respectively:
1
2
W (?,?) +
1
2
E [v(?,?,?)q + ev(?, q) + c(?, ?,?)q + ec(?, q)]? p
1
2
W (?,?)?
1
2
E [v(?, ?,?)q + ev(?, q) + c(?,?,?)q + ec(?, q)] + p
The choice of investment is therefore determined by
1 + q
2
B? +
1? q
2
S? = 1;
1 + q
2
S? +
1? q
2
B? = 1.
In other words, a non-contingent contract q ? 0 can implement any ?b,?s such that ?b =
?s ? 1/2. Indeed, substituting ?b = ?s = 1?q2 ,we obtain (7). It is important to emphasize
that contracts on quantities in excess of the average optimal quantity q > Eq? = 1 allow
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?implementation of negative ?b = ?s that correspond to positive perfectly symmetric
cross-e?ects. By writing a contract for an ine?ciently high quantity, parties provide
each other with greater incentives to invest. It is not possible, however, to implement the
first best if the cross-e?ects are stronger than self-e?ects (domain B in Fig.2); this would
imply tax rates ?b = ?s > 1/2 which would require contracts with negative quantities.
Message games. Consider a general message-contingent mechanism: based on parties’
reports on ?, ?,?, the mechanism prescribes quantity and price. Reconstructing the proof
of Proposition 2, one can obtain the following results: the first best can be implemented if
cross-e?ects are (i) symmetric and (ii) negative or weaker than cross-e?ects. If in all states
of nature either (i) or (ii) does not hold, then the first best cannot be implemented.16
Option contracts. Similar results hold for the option contracts if we assume the “deal-
me-out” solution. Options implement the first best only if cross-e?ects are negative or
weaker than self-e?ects, and if cross-e?ects are perfectly symmetric.
If we assume the “split-the-di?erence” solution, then cross-e?ects must be su ciently
symmetric, but not necessarily perfectly symmetric. Indeed, consider a contract that
provides the seller with an option to sell q at the price of ps. The split-the-di?erence rule
provides parties with the following expected ex post payo?s:
1
2
W (?,?)?
1
2
E [ps ? c(?,?,?)q ? ec(?, q)]+ ,
1
2
W (?,?) +
1
2
E [ps ? c(?, ?,?)q ? ec(?, q)]+ .
For simplicity, we shall again assume that the shock is multiplicative: c(?,?,?) =
µ(?)c(?,?). Then the first order conditions are as follows:
1
2
(B? + S?)?
1
2
?qS? = 1;
1
2
(B? + S?) +
1
2
?qS? = 1, (14)
where ? = Prob{ps > c(?, ?,?)q + ec(?, q)} ? [0, 1] is the probability of the option being
“in the money”.
The formulas (14) are equivalent to (7) for ?b = (1? ?q)/2, ?s = 1/2. The higher the
option price ps, the higher ?; for any ? ? [0, 1] there exists an option that implements ?.
Hence, through seller’s options parties can implement any choice of ?b ? 1/2,?s = 1/2.
Similarly, through call options (buyer’s options to oblige the seller deliver certain quantity
at a given price), one can implement ?b = 1/2,?s ? 1/2. By combining the two (i.e.
including two options that are valid only with certain probability, e.g. in certain states
of nature), parties can therefore implement any ?b ? 1/2,?s ? 1/2. These tax rates
provide e?cient incentives whenever
¡
S?? +B
?
?
¢
/2 ? 1/2, and
¯
S?? ?B??
¯
? 1. In other
words, first, the parties’ cross-e?ects should be negative or weaker on average than self-
e?ects (either party’s cross-e?ect can be stronger than her self-e?ect, but the sum of
cross-e?ects should be less than the sum of self-e?ects). Second, the cross-e?ects should
be su?ciently symmetric.
16The symmetry constraint is binding due to the lack of instruments: parties trade a scalar quantity of
a single good while they need to provide incentives for two investment variables. However, the problem
would hardly be solved even if parties traded several goods: the greater number of goods is traded, the
higher dimensionality of investments in qualities of di?erent goods.
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Property rights. If there is a physical asset that is complementary to investments,
allocation of property rights can also implement asymmetric ?b,?s. Indeed, upstream
(or downstream) integration helps implementing ?b = 1/2,?s = 0 (or ?b = 1/2,?s =
0). Hence for every surplus division rule ?b,?s such that ?b ? 1/2,?s ? 1/2, and
|?b ? ?s| < 1/2, there exists a convex combination of vertical integration and a non-
contingent contract that implements the rule. These rules provide e?cient incentives
whenever
¯
S?? ?B??
¯
? 1, S?? ? 1/2, and B?? ? 1/2. These constraints are more restric-
tive than those for the split-the-di?erence options: each cross-e?ect must be weaker than
self-e?ect.
The above results can be summarized as the following
Proposition 7 In the setting with continuous quantity, the first best can be implemented
in the following cases.
1. Suppose that cross-e?ects are perfectly symmetric and are weaker than self-e?ects:
S?? = B
?
? < 1/2. Then a non-contingent contract q = 1/(1 ? 2S??) implements the
first best.
2. If the split-the-di?erence solution applies, and the uncertainty is multiplicatively
separable, the first best can be implemented through an option contract if cross-
e?ects are negative or weaker on average than self-e?ects or negative
¡
S?? +B
?
?
¢
/2 ?
1/2, and the cross-e?ects are su?ciently symmetric
¯
S?? ?B??
¯
? 1.
3. Suppose that there is a physical asset that is complementary to specific investments.
The first best is implemented through allocation of property rights if the cross-e?ects
are su?ciently symmetric
¯
S?? ?B??
¯
? 1, and each cross-e?ect is either negative
or weaker than self-e?ects: S?? ? 1/2, B?? ? 1/2.
5 Concluding remarks
We have studied a model of bilateral trade where contracts are incomplete, both parties
invest, and investments may have both self- and cross-e?ects. We have calculated the
“taxes” that parties have to pay to each other in order to provide e?cient incentives
and studied the ranges of tax rates that can be implemented via di?erent contractual
arrangements. The first best can only be achieved if cross-e?ects are (i) su?ciently weak
or negative and (ii) symmetric (assuming equal bargaining power).
The intuition behind the first condition is straightforward. If cross-e?ects are negative,
a non-contingent contract provides incentives for overinvestment relative to the social
optimum. To reduce incentives, parties simply need to write a contract for a lower
quantity (or to write no contract at all) ex ante; then ex post holdup and renegotiation
adjust incentives down to the e?cient level. If the cross-e?ects are positive, then parties
need even greater incentives to invest than in the absence of cross-e?ects. To do so,
parties need to write a contract for excessively high quantities. It turns out, however,
that even contracts with very high quantities cannot implement first best if cross-e?ects
are stronger than self-e?ects.
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?The second problem is the asymmetry of cross-e?ects. If the strength and sign of
parties’ cross-e?ects di?er, a contract that encourages the first best investment by one
party may provide ine?cient incentives to the other. Suppose that one party’s cross-
e?ects are strong while the other’s are weak or negative. Then for the former party to
invest e?ciently, the contract should include high quantity; while for the latter, it is best
to have a contract with little or no trade.
In order to implement the first best, parties have to shift incentives from one party
(e.g. the one with weak or negative cross-e?ects) to the other (the one with strong
and positive cross-e?ects). This would certainly be feasible if parties could contract on
reallocation of bargaining power. In this paper, however, we rule out such solutions
as unrealistic and study the optimal choice of threatpoints. First, we consider option
contracts. We find that for some bargaining solutions, option contracts can indeed relax
the symmetry constraint. Second, in the special case where there is a specific physical
asset, we study the optimal assignment of property rights. The reallocation of property
rights also helps to relax the symmetry constraint. The properties of the first best
allocation are intuitive: the property rights are more likely to be given to a party with
positive cross-e?ects and are taken away from the party with negative cross-e?ects.
In addition to analyzing the first best, we also study the optimal allocation of prop-
erty rights in the situations when the first best cannot be achieved. The second best
arrangement is very simple. If cross-e?ects are weaker than self-e?ects, it includes verti-
cal integration in some states and the non-contingent contract in others. The property
rights are allocated to one party, but the parties also sign a non-contingent contract that
is valid only in some contingencies. If cross-e?ects are strong, the optimal arrangement
is di?erent. It includes vertical integration in some states and joint ownership in others;
contracting is never used. This is similar to the buyout options that are so common in
venture capital contracts: the parties own the asset jointly but in some states ownership
is transferred to one party (via equity options or via exit options). In the presence of
cross-e?ects, joint ownership is no longer dominated by one party ownership. When-
ever cross-e?ects are su ciently strong, the optimal mechanism includes joint ownership
with a positive probability. Moreover, for a certain range of parameters, joint owner-
ship dominates all other arrangements; neither property rights, nor contracting have any
value.
Our results extend the analysis of Che and Hausch (1999) and Segal and Whinston
(2002) to a setting where both parties invest, and where cross-e?ects can di?er in sign
and intensity. First, the higher cross-e?ects, the lower the value of contracting (like in
Che and Hausch) – hold-up is more important since it helps provide incentives for cross-
e?ects. If cross-e?ects are weak or negative, the first best can be implemented (like in
Segal and Whinston) but only if the cross-e?ects are symmetric. We show that property
rights can provide incentives for the asymmetric cross-e?ects through strengthening the
bargaining position of the party with stronger cross-e?ects. Our analysis re-emphasizes
the di?culties of providing incentives in the setting with cooperative investments. While
some mechanisms can help if cross-e?ects are negative or weak, there seems to be no
solution if cross-e?ects are positive, and are stronger than self-e?ects.
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Appendix: Proofs.
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof of part 1 is trivial. To prove 2, let us denote
(?C ,?C) the choice of investments for the non-contingent Contract, and (?N ,?N) — the
ones for the Null contract. We shall prove that if the cross-e?ects are positive and
su?ciently strong, then (a) non-contingent contract results in underinvestment; (b) the
underinvestment is more severe than the one under the null contract. Since the cross-
e?ects are stronger than self-e?ects,
W?(?C ,?C) = B?(?C ,?C)+S?(?C ,?C) > 2B?(?C ,?C) > 2 =W?(?N ,?N) > W?(??,??).
Since W (?,?) is concave, and W?? = 0, an increase in W? requires a decrease in ?.
Indeed, dW? = W??d?, and W?? < 0. Hence ?C < ?N < ??. Similarly, WC? > W ?? , and
?C < ?N < ??. Since for all ? < ??, the ex ante social welfare W ? ? ? ? increases
with ?, and for all ? < ?? it increases with ?, the null contract is less ine?cient than the
non-contingent contract.
If the cross-e?ects are positive but weaker than self-e?ects, similar reasoning results
in ?N < ?C < ?? and ?N < ?C < ??.
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof is trivial: using (4) we obtain B?? = 1 ? S?? and
S?? = 1?B??. Substituting into (7) and solving a system of two linear equations, we obtain
(8). The system is not consistent if S?? +B
?
? = 1 and S
?
? 6 = 1/2.
Proof of Lemma 2. We shall prove that incentive compatibility constraints imply
(9)-(11). Consider two arbitrary pairs (b0, s0) ? BxS and (b00, s00) ? BxS. By definition,
UB(b0, s0, b0, s0, b0, s0) ? UB(b00, s00, b0, s0, b0, s0) i.e.
UB(b0, s0, b0, s0, b0, s0) ? (1?X(b00, s00, b0, s0)) [b0 + s0]/2+
+X(b00, s00, b0, s0)[b0 + p¯? p(b00, s00, b0, s0)]? T (b00, s00, b0, s0)
On the other hand, US(b00, s00, b0, s0, b00, s00) ? US(b00, s00, b00, s00, b00, s00) which implies
UB(b00, s00, b0, s0, b00, s00) ? UB(b00, s00, b00, s00, b00, s00) i.e.
UB(b00, s00, b00, s00, b00, s00) ? (1?X(b00, s00, b0, s0)) [b00 + s00]/2+
+X(b00, s00, b0, s0)[b00 + p¯? p(b00, s00, b0, s0)]? T (b00, s00, b0, s0).
The two inequalities imply
K(b00, s00)?K(b0, s0) ?
b00 + s00
2
?
b0 + s0
2
+X(b00, s00, b0, s0)
µ
b00 ? s00
2
?
b0 ? s0
2
¶
. (15)
Similarly, UB(b0, s0, b0, s0, b0, s0) ? UB(b0, s0, b00, s00, b0, s0) and UB(b0, s0, b00, s00, b00, s00)
? UB(b00, s00, b00, s00, b00, s00) imply UB(b00, s00, b00, s00, b00, s00)? UB(b0, s0, b0, s0, b0, s0) ?
(1? Y (b0, s0, b00, s00))(b00 ? b0) +X(b0, s0, b00, s00)(s00 ? s0). Hence,
K(b00, s00)?K(b0, s0) ?
b00 + s00
2
?
b0 + s0
2
+X(b0, s0, b00, s00)
µ
b00 ? s00
2
?
b0 ? s0
2
¶
. (16)
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Let us take b00 = b0+? and s00 = s0. Since X ? [0, 1], inequalities (15)-(16) imply (9).
Similarly, by taking b00 = b0 and s00 = s0 +?, we obtain (10). By taking b00 = b0 +? and
s00 = s0 +?, we immediately arrive at (11).
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof of the first part is trivial: one should set
X(bB, sB, bS, sS) = 1 ? 2?b, and T (bB, sB, bS, sS) = 0, where ?b = ?s are given by (8).
Since cross-e?ects are negative, ?b = ?s ? 1/2, so X ? 0 and X ? 1 (Lemma 1).
Proof of 2a. Suppose that s?? > 0, w
?
? > 0 and the first best is achieved. This implies
that ?? maximizes EK(b(?, ?,??), s(?,?,??))? ?. Conditions (9)-(11) assure that K is
a continuous function (though not necessarily di?erentiable). Thus, let us take two se-
quences ?0n, ?
00
n converging to ?? such that ?? ? [?
0
n,?
00
n] and EK(b(?,?0n,??), s(?, ?0n,??))
??0n = EK(b(?, ?00n,??), s(?,?00n,??))? ?00n. Denoting ??n = ?00n ? ?0n, we obtain
EK(b(?,?00n,??), s(?, ?00n,??))?EK(b(?,?0n,??), s(?, ?0n,??)) = ??n.
Denote b0n = b(?,?0n,??), s0n = s(?, ?0n,??), b00n = b(?,?00n,??), s00n = s(?,?00n,??). Then
??n = E[K(b0n + s
0
n ? s
00
n, s
00
n)?K(b
0
n, s
0
n)] +E[K(b
00
n, s
00
n)?K(b
0
n + s
0
n ? s
00
n, s
00
n)] (17)
Dividing and multiplying the first term by (s00n ? s0n) we obtain
E[K(b0n + s
0
n ? s
00
n, s
00
n)?K(b
0
n, s
0
n)] = ??S
?
???n + o(??n). (18)
Here ? is a weighted average of [K(b0n, s0n)?K(b0n+ s0n?s00n, s00n)]/(s00n?s0n) across states of
nature. Since the cross-e?ect of buyer’s investment is positive s? > 0, we have s00n? s0n =
s???n + o(??n) > 0 for su?ciently small ??n. Using (11) we obtain ? ? [0, 1].
Similarly,
E[K(b00n, s
00
n)?K(b
0
n + s
0
n ? s
00
n, s
00
n)] = ?W
?
???n + o(??n) = ???n + o(??n), (19)
where ? is a weighted average of [K(b00n, s00n)?K(b0n + s0n ? s00n, s00n)]/[(b00n + s00n)? (b0n + s0n)]
across states of nature. Since w?(?,??,??) > 0, b00n + s00n > b0n + s0n holds, and condition
(9) implies ? ? [1/2, 1].
Substituting (18), (19) for the right-hand side in (17) and using Taylor expansion for
E{(b?+ s?)? (b+ s)} we obtain 1 = ?? ?S??. This can only be satisfied when ? = 0 and
? = 1 (otherwise ? ? ?S?? < 1). But this is not possible: ? = 0 requires X = 0 for all
messages, so that ? must be equal to 1/2.
Proof of 2b. First, (9)-(11) implies that K(b, s) = b+s
2
+ L
¡
b?s
2
¢
, where L (·) is such
that L (? +?)? L (?) ? [0,?] for every ? and ? > 0. The seller gets b + s?K(b, s) =
b+s
2
? L
¡
b?s
2
¢
. Suppose that the first best is achieved. Since ?? maximizes EK ? ? =
W/2 + EL? ?, a small change of ?? = ? in the buyer’s investment should involve the
change in the expected value of L by ? ? 1
2
W ?? ? + o(?) =
1
2
? + o(?). Similarly, since ??
maximizes W/2? EL? ?, a small change of ?? = ?? must change the expected value
of L by ? ? 1
2
W ??? + o(?) = 12? + o(?). However, since b? ? s? < b? ? s? ? (?1 + ?2),this
can only be the case if EL is constant in the neighborhood of the first best (up to a
change of the order of o(??) = o(??)). This, however, implies that parties incentives
are equivalent to those under the null contract. Since the null contract is never e?cient,
this is not possible.
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Proof of 3. Suppose that a mechanism X, p, T implements a surplus division rule
K(b, s). Let us denote ?0,?0 the investment levels chosen by the parties. We shall show
that if in some states of nature X > 0 then the mechanism is dominated by the null
contract. First, let us show that W?(?0,?0) ? 1 and W?(?0,?0) ? 1 with at least one
inequality being strict. Neither party overinvests and at least one underinvests. Therefore
if parties were able to implement higher levels of investments, the change in social surplus
would be positive: d(W ????) = (W??1)d?+(W??1)d? > 0 for d? > 0 and d? > 0.
By definition ?0 maximizes EK(b(?, ?,?0), s(?,?,?0))??. Similarly to the Proof of
Part 2a, we shall take an arbitrary sequence ?0n that converges to ?0 from below ?0n < ?0.
Since K is a continuous function, for each ?0n < ?0 we can introduce another sequence
?00n that converges to ?0 from the above ?00n > ?0 and EK(b(?,?0n,?0), s(?, ?0n,?0)) ?
?0n = EK(b(?, ?00n,?0), s(?,?00n,?0)) ? ?00n. When n ? ?, we have both ?0n ? ?0 and
?00n ? ?0. Hence, EK(b(?,?00n,?0), s(?, ?00n,?0)) ? EK(b(?, ?0n,?0), s(?,?0n,?0)) = ??n,
where ??n = ?00n ? ?0n.
Denote b0n = b(?,?0n,?0), s0n = s(?, ?0n,?0), b00n = b(?,?00n,?0), s00n = s(?,?00n,?0). Then
??n = E[K(b0n + s
0
n ? s
00
n, s
00
n)?K(b
0
n, s
0
n)] +E[K(b
00
n, s
00
n)?K(b
0
n + s
0
n ? s
00
n, s
00
n)]·
Since the cross-e?ect is positive, s00n?s0n > 0 (for su?ciently large n). Conditions (9)-(11)
imply that the first term is non-positive. Using (9), we can show that the second term
equals ?W?(?0,?0)?? + o(??n) where ? ? [0, 1]. Therefore W?(?0,?0) ? 1. Similarly,
W?(?0,?0) ? 1. At least one of the inequalities must be strict; otherwise the mechanism
would have achieved the first best which is not possible according to Part 1.
Let us consider the mechanism X˜, p, T˜ that implements the null contract: X˜ = 0,e p =e
p, T˜ = 0, K˜(b, s) = (b + s)/2. Let us prove that parties invest (weakly) more under
K˜ than under K. We shall prove that for a given ?, the buyer has more incentives to
invest under K˜. Indeed, let us fix ? and ?0 and consider ?00 > ?0 su?ciently close to ?0.
Compare the parties’ payo?s for outcomes (b0, s0) = (b(?, ?0,?), s(?,?0,?)) and (b00, s00) =
(b(?, ?00,?), s(?,?00,?)). The mechanism X˜, Y˜ , T˜B allows to implement a surplus division
rule such that K˜(b00, s00)?K˜(b0, s0) > K(b00, s00)?K(b0, s0) for all ?0 < ?00. Using, let us (15)
for X,T, we obtain K(b00, s00) ? K(b0, s0) ? K˜(b00, s00) ? K˜(b0, s0) + X(b0, s0, b00, s00)[(s00 ?
s0) ? (b00 ? b0)] which is non-negative. Indeed, (s00 ? s0) > (b00 ? b0) since cross-e?ects
are stronger than self-e?ects s? > b?. Therefore under K˜, the buyer chooses a (weakly)
greater ? for a given ?. Since b?? = 0, the buyer’s optimal choice does not depend on the
?. Hence, the buyer invests (weakly) more under the mechanism K˜ rather than under
K. Similarly, we can prove that the seller chooses greater ?. Since both parties want to
invest more, the change in welfare is non-negative.
The proof of the last statement of the Proposition is perfectly similar.
Proof of Proposition 3. Since the shock is multiplicative, for each ? ? [0, 1]
there exist pb, ps such that the investment levels solve
(1? ?/2)B? + ?S?/2 = 1, (1? ?/2)S? + ?B?/2 = 1. (20)
Indeed, let us introduce ?1(?,?) and ?2(?,?) such that ?(?1(?,?))(v¯(?,?)+c¯(?,?))/2 =
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ps and ?(?2(?,?))(v¯(?,?) + c¯(?,?))/2 = pb. The buyer’s payo? isZ ?1(?,?)
0
(v ? ps)f(?)d? +
Z ?2(?,?)
?1(?,?)
v ? c
2
f(?)d? +
Z 1
?2(?,?)
(v ? pb)f(?)d? ? ?.
The first-order condition is
B? ?
Z ?2(?,?)
?1(?,?)
v? + c?
2
f(?)d? = B? ?
v¯? + c¯?
2
Z ?2(?,?)
?1(?,?)
?(?)f(?)d? = 1. (21)
Similarly, the seller’s investment choice is given by
S? +
Z ?2(?,?)
?1(?,?)
v? + c?
2
f(?)d? = S? +
v¯? + c¯?
2
Z ?2(?,?)
?1(?,?)
?(?)f(?)d? = 1.
Since ?1 increases with ps and ?2 increases with pb one can choose such pb, ps thatZ ?2(?,?)
?1(?,?)
?(?)f(?)d? = ?
Z 1
0
?(?)f(?)d?
Under such pb, ps the f.o.c. become (20). Hence, for arbitrary ?b = ?s ? [0, 1/2] we can
take ? = 2?s so that (20) coincide with (7).
The last statement of the proposition directly follows from the Corollary 1.
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 3. Since the
shock is separably multiplicative, for each ? ? [0, 1] there exists pb such thatZ
v?pb
v?f(?)d? = ?B?,
Z
v?pb
v?f(?)d? = ?B?.
Indeed, such pb must solve
R
?(?1)?pb/v¯(?,?)
?(?1)f(?1)d?1 = ?
R
?(?1)f(?1)d?1. For ? =
0 this equation has a solution pb = p¯, for ? = 1 there is a solution pb = sup v. Hence such
pb exists for all ? ? [0, 1].
Similarly, we can prove that for each ? ? [0, 1] there exists ps such thatZ
c?ps
(?c?)f(?2)d?2 = ?S?,
Z
c?ps
(?c?)f(?2)d?2 = ?S?.
Given pb, ps, the buyer maximizes E(v ? (min{v, pb}+max{c, ps})/2)? ? i.e.
B ?
1
2
Z
v>pb
pbf(?)d? ?
1
2
Z
v?pb
vf(?)d? ?
1
2
Z
c>ps
cf(?)d? ?
1
2
Z
c?ps
psf(?)d? ? ?.
Since the term proportional to the change in the integration limits is infinitesimal, the
first-order condition becomes (1 ? ?/2)B? + ?S?/2 = 1. Similarly, the seller’s choice is
given by the first order condition (1? ?/2)S? + ?B?/2 = 1.
For arbitrary ?b,?s ? [0, 1/2] we can take ? = 2?s, ? = 2?s so that the first order
conditions coincide with (7).
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The last statement of the proposition directly follows from the Corollary 1.
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof directly follows from (8).
Proof of Proposition 6. Let us introduce
J(?b,?s) =W (?(?b,?s),?(?b,?s))? ?(?b,?s)? ?(?b,?s)
where ?(?b,?s),?(?b,?s) solve (7) under given ?b,?s. Then
?J
??b
=
(W? ? 1)S?
?[(1? ?s)B?? + ?bS??]
?
(W? ? 1)S?
?[(1? ?b)S?? + ?sB??]
,
?J
??s
=
(W? ? 1)B?
?[(1? ?b)S?? + ?sB??]
?
(W? ? 1)B?
?[(1? ?s)B?? + ?bS??]
. (22)
The second best choice of ?b,?s maximizes J(?b,?s) over the square ?b ? [0, 1/2],
?s ? [0, 1/2]. Since the first best cannot be achieved, there cannot be an interior so-
lution. Determining the signs of ?J/??b and ?J/??s is made easy by two observations:
(i) denominators in (22) are non-negative, (ii) a positive cross-e?ect S? > 0 implies
underinvestment by the respective party: W? ? 1 > 0. The first fact follows from
concavity. Let us prove the second one. Suppose that W? ? 1 ? 0. Using (7) we obtain
0 ?W??1 = (1??b?B?(1??b??s))/?b. Since the cross e?ect is positive, B? < W? ? 1.
Hence, the right-hand side is strictly greater than ?s/?b ? 0.
The first two statements deal with the dichotomy between the mechanisms with ?b+
?s < 1/2 (combination of vertical integration and the non-contingent contract) and
?b + ?s > 1/2 (combination of vertical integration and joint ownership). Suppose that
the latter is the case. Then in the second best, both ?J/??b, ?J/??s must be non-
negative and one of them must be strictly positive. Then (22) implies S?/S? > B?/B?.
Hence, whenever cross-e?ects are weak S?B? < B?S?, then ?b + ?s > 1/2 cannot be
the case; the non-contingent contract is used with a non-trivial probability. Similarly,
?b + ?s > 1/2 implies S?/S? < B?/B?.
The proof of the third statement is also straightforward. If the seller’s cross-e?ect is
negative, then there can be three cases: (i) the seller underinvests W? ? 1 > 0, then
?J/??s < 0, so the optimal contract is a combination of the non-contingent contract and
buyer’s ownership; (ii) the seller overinvests W? ? 1 < 0, then ?J/??b > 0, the second
best is a combination of buyer’s ownership and joint ownership; (iii) the seller invests
at the first best level W? ? 1 = 0, then ?J/??s < 0 < ?J/??b, the second best is pure
buyer’s ownership.
If the seller’s self-e?ect is non-positive, then (22) implies ?J/??s > 0. Similarly, if the
buyer’s self-e?ect is non-positive, then ?J/??s > 0. Hence if both self-e?ects are negative
or zero, it is optimal to have pure joint ownership ?b = ?s = 1/2.
Proof of Proposition 7. The proof directly follows from the discussion in Section
4 and Lemma 1.
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